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How not to trivialise the Identity of Indiscernibles
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra
1. The Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (PII, hereafter) says that no two things differ
solo  numero.  That  means that  when two things  differ  numerically  there is  also  a further
difference between them. This further difference I shall call qualitative difference. 
This  qualitative  difference  can  be  an  internal  difference  between  things  or  a
difference as to how things are related to things. These differences can also be explained in
terms of properties: in the former case qualitative difference consists  in a difference with
respect  to intrinsic properties,  in the latter  case it  consists  in a difference with respect  to
relational properties. 
Relational properties may depend on the identity of the relatum (or on the identity of 
relata of  the  relatum),  or  they may be purely  qualitative.  Properties  that  depend  on  the
identity of a  relatum,  like  being two miles from the Eiffel Tower,  are often called  impure
properties.1 Those that do not depend on the identity of a relatum, like being two miles from
a tall tower, are called pure properties. 
Since intrinsic properties do not depend on the identity of any relatum they are also
classified  as  pure.  But  given my understanding of  ‘qualitative  difference’,  both  pure  and
impure properties can make a qualitative difference.2
1 Often, but not always. In Individuals Strawson calls them universals-cum-particulars (1959: 137). 
2 No doubt my understanding of the phrase ‘qualitative difference’ is idiosyncratic, since normally only
pure properties would be taken to make a qualitative difference. But I have found no better phrase to
express what I want to express, namely that difference which is not merely numerical difference, i.e.
which is not a solo numero difference. As I said, what I mean by qualitative difference is any difference
that is not merely a numerical difference. But differing with respect to some impure properties,  for
instance differing with respect to the impure property of being two miles from the Eiffel Tower, is more
than differing merely numerically. In what follows, the reader should bear in mind that in this paper
qualitative  difference  is  neither  synonymous  nor  coextensive  with difference  with  respect  to  pure
properties.
Given that the difference can be captured in terms of properties, PII is normally taken
to assert either that there are no two things that share all their properties or, in its necessitated
version,  that  there  can  be  no  two  such  things.  Here  is  a  formal  statement  of  the  non-
necessitated version: 
PII (x)(y)[(F)(Fx ≡ Fy) ⊃ x = y)]3
Both  in  the  necessitated  and  the  non-necessitated  version  the  domain  of  properties  over
which one quantifies is crucial for the truth of PII. Indeed the more one restricts the domain
of properties quantified over the more likely for PII to come out false. And if one puts no
restriction at all in the domain of properties quantified, then PII comes out true but, as it is
often pointed out, trivially true. 
The triviality of this version of PII depends on certain properties being included in
the domain  of  property  quantification.  I  shall  call  those  properties  that  render  PII trivial
trivialising  properties.  Since  PII,  far  from being  a  trivial  principle,  is  one  of  the  most
substantive  and  controversial  ideas  in  metaphysics,  it  is  important  to  determine  which
properties  must  be  excluded  from the  domain  of  quantification  to  get  a  metaphysically
serious version of PII. 
If one excludes from the domain of quantification all and only trivialising properties
then one ensures a non-trivial and to that extent a metaphysically serious version of PII. That
version will be the weakest non-trivial version of PII. For every other non-trivial version of
PII will entail the truth of the version that excludes all and only trivialising properties. But
that it is the weakest does not make it unworthy of metaphysical discussion. That weakest
version will make a non-trivial claim and establishing it may be as difficult as establishing
other versions of PII. 
3 If one takes second order variables to range over sets then the principle in the text is merely a set-
theoretical analogue of PII, rather than PII itself. One can also express PII as a first order principle, e.g.
(x)(y)(z)[(x has z ≡ y has z) ⊃ (x = y)], where ‘x has z’ is true if and only if z is a property of x. In this
paper I shall stick to the canonical second order formulation in the text. But whether the principle must
be formulated as a first or second order principle is not relevant for the purposes of the present paper. 
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I shall  not discuss whether the weakest non-trivial  version of PII is true.  But it  is
significant that, as it will have become clear in §7, the weakest non-trivial version of PII will
quantify over some impure properties, like  being the father of a or  being one meter apart
from a. Thus I disagree with Peter Strawson, who said that the only version of PII which is
worth discussing is one according to which there exists, for every thing, some description in
purely  universal  or  general  terms  such  that  only  that  thing  answers  to  that  description
(Strawson 1959:  120).4 Indeed normally the  following three  versions  of  the principle  are
distinguished (here I present only the non-necessitated variant of each version):
PII1: No two things share all their intrinsic properties
PII2: No two things share all their pure properties
PII3: No two things share all their properties 
PII1 is the strongest version, PII3 the weakest. Philosophers typically claim or suggest that
these are the only three versions of PII and that PII3 is a trivial version of PII (to cite only a
few: Adams 1979: 11; Forrest 2002, §1; van Cleve 2002: 389-90). While I agree that PII3 is
trivial, I disagree that the other two are the only non-trivial versions of the principle. Indeed
part of the significance of the discussion to follow is that shows the existence and importance
of the following version of PII, weaker than PP2 but stronger than PII3:
PII2.5: No two things share all their non-trivialising properties
 
I take PII2.5 to be the weakest non-trivial version of PII. And since not all impure properties
are trivialising properties, PII2.5 quantifies over some impure properties. The main aim of the
paper  is  then  to  specify  the  class  of  trivialising  properties.  But  I  want  to  produce  a
philosophically illuminating specification of such a class. That is, I want to be able to say
4 There is another dimension in which I would disagree with Strawson, since in that passage he also
makes the necessitated version of PII the only one worth discussing (Strawson 1959: 120). But I cannot
discuss this issue here.
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what makes a certain property trivialising. This is why I shall specify the class of trivialising
properties intensionally rather than merely extensionally. 
In the next section I shall introduce the paradigmatic kind of trivialising properties.
In  §3  I  shall  discuss  other  trivialising  properties  and  I  shall  argue  against  giving  a
characterisation  of  trivialising  properties  in  terms  of  the  notion  of  entailment  between
properties.  In  §4  I  shall  discuss,  and  eventually  find  unsatisfactory,  another  way  of
characterising trivialising properties, in terms of the notion of property containment. In §§5-6
I shall present and discuss my own characterisation of trivialising properties. §7 is a brief
conclusion. 
2. When one quantifies over all properties of things, what PII asserts is that no two things
share all their properties. This version of PII is true but trivially true, as it has been widely
recognised. To see why this version of PII is true consider property (1) below, which is an
instance of what I call properties of identity:5
(1) being identical to a. 
If one quantifies over all properties, PII is true because if any things a and b share all their
properties,  including (1),  then they are  identical  and so they are  not two things.  We can
deploy the structure of the argument in the following way:   
(i) a and b share all their properties. 
(ii) a has the property of being identical to a. 
5 It is important to be clear what properties of identity are. Having recourse to the property abstraction
λ-operator  makes  that  clear.  The  λ-operator  binds  a  variable  from a  first  order  open  sentence  to
designate the property expressed by that open sentence. Thus properties of identity are those that in
their  λ-expression the open sentence from which the  λ-operator binds a variable consists only of an
identity sign flanked by an individual variable and an individual constant.  So properties like  being
identical  to  a and  being  identical  to  b are  properties  of  identity because  their  λ-expressions  are,
respectively, ‘(λx)(x = a)’ and ‘(λx)(x = b)’. But the properties of being identical to something or being
self-identical are not properties of identity. Their λ-expressions, ‘(λx)(x = y)’ and ‘(λx)(x = x)’, do not
satisfy our characterization. 
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(iii) b has the property of being identical to a. 
(iv) Therefore, a = b.
Since (1) asserts the indiscernibility of  a and  b, the argument (i)-(iv) derives identity from
indiscernibility  by  using  a  property  of  identity.  (i)  is  the  assumption  of  indiscernibility
between  a and  b needed to get the argument started.  (ii)  follows,  assuming properties  of
identity, from the general law that everything is self-identical, i.e. (x)(x = x). (i) and (ii) entail
(iii), which states that b has the property of being identical to a, but if b has the property of
being  identical  to  a,  it  follows  that  b is  identical  to  a,  i.e.  (iv).6 So,  if  a and  b are
indiscernible, they are identical, i.e. PII is true.7 
This  argument  for  PII  is  simple  and  clear  and  it  turns  the  denial  of  PII  into  a
contradiction,  since  denying  it  would  amount  to  saying  that  there  are  two  non-identical
particulars that share all their properties, including their properties of identity, and therefore
they are identical.  But note that this argument supports PII only because it  is a case of a
general argument that can be applied to every two particular things that are supposed to be
indiscernible.  Taken in itself  the  argument only proves that  there is nothing indiscernible
from a, not that there is no pair of indiscernibles. But, since everything is self-identical, this
argument can be generalized. Other instances of the argument will use other properties of
identity, like being identical to b, being identical to c, or any others. 
So properties of identity make PII true. But they make it trivially true. No doubt the
proof of this version of PII has an undeniable air of triviality, but what matters here is not the
triviality of the proof but the triviality of what is proved.8 For it is trivial to claim that no
numerically distinct things share all their properties,  including their  properties of identity.
Properties  of  identity  are  trivialising  properties,  since  they  do  not  make  a  qualitative
6 That b is identical to a follows only on the assumption that if a thing has property F then it is F. This
is unexceptionable, and should not be confused with the more controversial principle that if a thing is F
then it has property F. 
7 Informal versions of (i)-(iv) appear in Brody 1980: 9, Katz 1983: 37, Legenhausen 1989: 626, and
Whitehead and Russell 1925: 57.
8 The trivialising nature of properties of identity is recognised in, among others, Adams 1979: 11, Ayer
1954: 29, Black 1952: 155, Katz 1983: 37-8, Legenhausen 1989: 626, O’Connor 1954: 103-4.
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difference. They must be excluded from the domain of quantification to get a metaphysically
serious version of PII. 
3. If properties of identity were the only trivialising properties, our problem would be trivial.
But  although  they  are  paradigmatic  trivialising  properties,  there  are  other  trivialising
properties. For if properties of identity trivialise PII, then so do conjunctive properties like
(2):
(2) being identical to a and being green. 
Suppose a certain thing a is green; one can then show that there is nothing indiscernible from
it in the following way:
(v) a and b share all their properties. 
(vi) a has the property of being identical to a and being green. 
(vii) b has the property of being identical to a and being green.
(viii) Therefore, a = b.
This argument is generalisable in the relevant way, for even if not every thing is identical to
a and green, everything has some conjunctive property one of whose conjuncts is a property
of identity and the other is some other property. So conjunctive properties like (2) establish
PII.
But what they establish is trivial, since all the work in the proof is done by (1). The
reason why in the argument above the real work is done by the property of being identical to
a is that everything having the property of being identical to a and being green must have the
property of being identical to a. So a and b cannot share (2) without being identical. In other
words, property (2) entails property (1) in the sense that nothing having the former can lack
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the latter.9 Since every property entails  itself,  if  all  and only trivialising properties  entail
properties of identity, then we have a solution to our problem: 
D1 F is a trivialising property =def. F entails a property of identity. 
But  D1 is  wrong,  if  only  because  there  are  trivialising  properties  that  do  not  entail  any
properties of identity.10 Consider property (3):
(3) being numerically distinct from a. 
Property (3) is the complement of property (1), the property of  being identical to a. I shall
call any complement of a property of identity a property of difference. Property (3) does not
entail property (1) and, in general, properties of difference do not entail properties of identity.
Yet  property  (3)  can  be  used  to  show  there  is  nothing  indiscernible  from  a.  For  since
indiscernibles are those that share exactly the same properties, indiscernibles are those that
lack exactly the same properties, and so we can run the following argument: 
(ix) a and b lack exactly the same properties. 
(x) a lacks the property of being numerically distinct from a. 
(xi) b lacks the property of being numerically distinct from a.
(xii) Therefore, a = b.11 
9 This is the sense in which I shall conceive of property entailment in this essay and this is the usual way
of conceiving property entailment. See, for instance, Carnap 1988: 17, Katz 1983: 44 , and Lewis 1983:
199. 
10 It may be thought that the problem with D1 is that, given that it is necessary that everything is self-
identical and that if any thing is self-identical then that thing has a property of identity, all properties
entail properties of identity and so, according to D1, all properties trivialise PII. This would show D1 to
be wrong, since some properties, like being green, do not trivialize PII. But this is not a problem for
D1. For even if it is necessary that everything is self-identical and that if any thing is self-identical then
that thing has a property of identity, it does not follow that all properties entail properties of identity.
For all that follows from this is that every property F is such that it is necessary that if any thing has F,
then that thing has some property of identity. But it does not follow from it that for every property F
there is a property of identity F* such that it is necessary that if any thing has F, then that thing has F*.
And only in this latter case does every property F entail a property of identity. 
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Again, although this argument refers to a and b only, the argument is generalisable to apply
to any two things supposed indiscernible, and thus properties of difference establish PII. But
the thesis established is trivial, for the work in such arguments is again done by properties of
identity, since lacking a property of difference is equivalent to having a property of identity.
So properties of difference must also be excluded from the domain of quantification of any
metaphysically serious of PII.  
Properties  of  difference  are  not  the  only  trivialising properties  that  do not  entail
properties of identity. Consider property (4):
(4) being numerically distinct from a or not being green. 
Property (4) is the complement of property (2). Since no two things can lack property (4), it
can be used to deploy an argument similar to (ix)-(xii). Since that argument is generalisable
in the relevant way, properties like (4) prove PII. But it should be clear that the thesis thereby
established is trivial since all the work in such arguments is done by the property of  being
identical to a. For lacking the property of  being numerically distinct from a or not being
green is equivalent to having the property of being identical to a and being green, and no two
things  can  share  this  one because  they would  share  the  non-shareable  property  of  being
identical to a. 
11 I have found no version of (ix)-(xii) in the literature, but something similar to it is in Katz 1983: 40.
There are also arguments that derive discernibility from numerical difference, like the following two,
which I shall deploy using the λ-operator:
(i2) a ≠ b (ix3) a ≠ b
(ii2) (λx)(x = a)(a) (x3) ¬(λx)(x ≠ a)(a)
(iii2) ¬(λx)(x = a)(b) (xi3) (λx)(x ≠ a)(b)
(iv2) (∃F)(Fa & ¬Fb) (xii3) (∃F)(¬Fa & Fb)
These arguments are contrapositive versions of (i)-(iv) and (ix)-(xii). Informal versions of (i2)-(iv2) and
(ix2)-(xii2), or of mixtures of them, appear in Adams 1979: 11, Ayer 1954: 29, Bergmann 1953: 77,
Black 1952: XX, Broad 1933: 172-3, Greenlee 1968: 760, McTaggart 1921: 96, O’Connor 1954: 103-
4, Odegard 1964: 204 and Russell 1959: 115. The arguments (i)-(iv), (i2)-(iv2), (ix)-(xii) and (ix2)-(xii2)
are clearly related to each other, but they have never been clearly differentiated and, sometimes, they
are thought of as a single argument (e.g. Adams 1979: 11, footnote 11, seems to confound several of
them).
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This suggests that trivialising properties are those having or lacking which entails
having a property of identity. Since lacking a property is having its complement, we may
attempt to define trivialising properties as follows:
D2 F is a trivialising property =def. (1) F entails a property of identity or (2) the complement
of F entails a property of identity.
But D2 is wrong, for not all trivialising properties satisfy it. Consider properties (5) and (6): 
(5) being identical to a or being green 
(6) being identical to a or not being green. 
Neither (5) nor its complement entail a property of identity. The same is true of (6) and its
complement. Many things could and do have them and many things could and do lack them.
Nevertheless  they  make PII true.  For  nothing  can  have  both  of  them.  But  they  make  it
trivially true, because having both of them entails having property (1). It is only thanks to this
entailment that together they make PII true.
The same is true of the complements of properties (5) and (6), properties (7) and (8)
respectively:
(7) being numerically distinct from a and not being green 
(8) being numerically distinct from a and being green
For although neither having nor lacking either (7) or (8) entails having a property of identity,
lacking both of them does entail having (1), the property of being identical to a. In general,
properties  like (7) and (8) are such that lacking both of them entails  having a property of
identity. So such properties make PII trivially true. 
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One might decide to exclude from the property domain of PII only one property from
such pairs like (5) and (6). But this would be arbitrary. There is no reason to count either of
them as trivialising that does not apply to the other. Thus we should count both of them as
trivialising properties. Ditto for (7) and (8).  This suggests we replace D2 by D3 below: 
D3. F is a trivialising property =def. (a) F or its complement entails a property of identity, or
(b) F or its complement is the conjunct of a conjunctive property which entails a property of
identity and the other conjunct(s) neither individually nor jointly entail a property of identity.
D3 rightly makes (5) and (6) trivialising properties, since they are the conjuncts of (5)&(6),
and so they satisfy condition (b) in D3. Ditto for (7) and (8). But D3 has a crucial defect: it
counts as trivialising some properties that are not. Consider properties (9) and (10) below:
 
(9) being green. 
(10) being (identical to a or not green) and being green.12
The defect  of  D3 is  that  it  makes (9)  a trivialising property,  for  (9)  satisfies  the  second
disjunct  in  its  definiens.  In effect,  (9)  is  a  conjunct  of  (10),  which  entails  a  property  of
identity, but the other conjunct of (10), namely (6), entails no property of identity. But (9) is
the  property  of  being  green.  And  the  property  of  being  green is  a  paradigmatic  non-
trivialising property. 
I do not see how to solve this difficulty in terms of the notion of entailment. But even
if there is such a satisfactory solution, trying to define trivialising properties as those that
somehow  or  other  entail  properties  of  identity  is  marred  from  the  beginning.  For  any
definition that  counts  properties  that  entail  properties  of  identity  as trivialising properties
assumes that  no pure properties entail  properties  of identity. But suppose things had pure
12 Let us resort to  λ-formulations to make clear what property (10) is. Where ‘Gx’ stands for ‘x is
green’, (10) is the following property: (λx)((x = a ∨ ¬Gx) & Gx).
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individual essences. Imagine, for the sake of example,  that  being the greatest philosopher
was  the  individual  essence  of  Plato.  In  that  case  the  property  of  being  the  greatest
philosopher would entail  a property of identity,  namely the property of  being identical to
Plato. If all things have pure individual essences then PII is true, and it is true thanks to these
pure  individual  essences.  But  a  property  like  being  the  greatest  philosopher  does  not
trivialise PII. If what one proves is that numerically different things must have different pure
individual  essences  then  one  has  established  that  every  numerical  difference  goes
accompanied by a qualitative difference – and this is no triviality.13 
The point can perhaps be better appreciated by considering Leibniz’s position. For
Leibniz  all  things  (individual  substances)  have  qualitative  essences,  expressed  by  their
complete concepts (and therefore more complex than anything like the property of being the
greatest philosopher). These essences entail properties of identity and so they guarantee PII.
But no doubt Leibniz’s was not a trivial version of PII.
Whether or not things have pure individual essences is not the question here. The
point  is  simply  that,  whether  or  not  things  have  such  essences,  D3  is  inadequate  as  a
characterisation  of  trivialising  properties.  First,  if  things  have  such  essences,  D3  is
extensionally wrong. Second, even if things do not have such essences, a  formulation of a
non-trivial version of PII should not presuppose that things do not have such essences. Third,
even if things do not have such essences, and all trivialising properties satisfy D3, the mere
conceptual possibility of things having pure individual essences shows that D3 does not tell
us why trivialising properties trivialise PII. 
4. We need a different  kind of definition of trivialising properties. Since it seems clear that
trivialising properties  are  those  related in  some special  way to  properties  of  identity,  the
question  is:  how  are  trivialising  properties  related  to  properties  of  identity,  if  not  by
entailment? 
13 To make the point of this paragraph I do not need to invoke pure individual essences. Invoking the
possibility of impure individual essences that are not trivialising would have been good enough. But the
point is more forcefully made by invoking the possibility of pure individual essences. 
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The intuitive answer is that they  contain properties of identity. And this marks the
difference between a trivialising property like (6), which contains the property of identity (1),
and a non-trivialising property like (9), which does not contain any property of identity. 
This approach looks promising. Indeed Katz proposes a solution in terms of a notion
of containment. But what Katz does is to specify the class of trivialising predicates, which is
not the same as specifying the class of trivialising properties if only because presumably, as
Katz acknowledges, there are properties which no predicate expresses. 
What is Katz’s definition of trivialising predicates? He first introduces what he calls
basic identity properties (BIPs) as follows:
F is a BIP if and only if (1) it is possible that (∃x)(Fx) and (2) it is necessary that (x)(y)(Fx &
Fy ⊃ x = y)
Let us call predicates expressing BIPs  BIP-predicates.  Katz says that a BIP-predicate is a
trivialising predicate and that a predicate ‘P’ contains a BIP-predicate essentially provided
‘P’ contains a BIP-predicate but is not logically equivalent to a predicate that does not: ‘x is
numerically  distinct  from  a’  contains  a  BIP-predicate  essentially,  but  ‘x is  green  and
(identical to a or numerically distinct from a)’ does not. Then Katz says that a predicate ‘P’
expresses a trivialising property if and only if ‘P’ contains a BIP-predicate essentially or ‘P’
may be defined in terms of some predicate that does. This, of course, makes such properties
like (1)−(8) above, and also (10) and others, trivialising properties. Needless to say, this does
not make a property like (9) a trivialising property.14
14 I have altered Katz’s terminology. He calls BIP-predicates identity-predicates and he calls trivialising
properties  identity-properties. So what he actually says is that ‘a predicate, P, expresses an identity-
property if and only if P contains an identity predicate essentially or may be defined in terms of some
predicate  that  does’  (Katz  1983:  41).  I  changed  Katz’s  terminology  because  of  its  potential  for
confusion. ‘Identity predicate’ suggests a predicate that expresses a property of identity, but as we shall
see below not all BIPs are properties of identity. ‘Identity property’ suggests a property of identity, but
as we have seen not all trivialising properties are properties of identity. Katz was of course aware that
not all trivialising properties are properties of identity, and although he did not realise that all BIPs are
properties of identity, nothing here should be taken to imply that Katz used his terminology confusingly
or confusedly. He used his terminology clearly and consistently, but nevertheless his terminology has
potential for confusion. 
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What  are  we  to  say  about  Katz’s  definition  of  trivialising  predicates?  Three
comments. First, that it wrongly makes trivialising properties those expressed by superlative
predicates,  i.e.  predicates  like ‘being the tallest  man’,  ‘being the  widest  river’  etc.  Such
superlative properties are  BIPs. But superlative properties  in general do not  trivialise PII.
Superlative properties, being BIPs, cannot be shared, e.g. no two things could be the tallest
man. But they do not serve to prove PII, since not everything must have one of them. The
most one can do with them is to assert that if something has a superlative property then that
thing  has  no  indiscernibles,  but  this,  of  course,  is  far  from  asserting  that  nothing  has
indiscernibles, which is what PII requires. If they do not make PII true, superlative properties
cannot make it trivially true. 
But perhaps everything has a superlative property relative to certain reference class?
I am not sure. In a world like that imagined by Max Black (1952: 156), consisting of only two
indiscernible iron spheres, there seems to be no superlative property that either sphere has
relative to any reference class.  In any case,  even if  everything has a superlative property
relative to some reference class,  the  problem with Katz’s  proposal  is  that  it  makes those
properties  that  are superlative relative to no class (or relative to the most inclusive class)
trivialising, which they are not.
In any case the difficulty with superlative properties can be met by just letting BIPs
be properties of identity – in that case superlative properties will not counts as trivialising
properties for they will not be expressed by trivialising predicates.
Second, Katz does not explain what it is for a predicate to contain another. So it is
not clear which predicates contain BIP-predicates and which do not, and therefore it is not
clear which predicates express trivialising properties and which do not. For although it may
be intuitively clear that the predicate ‘is green’ does not contain any BIP-predicate, intuition
suggests that the predicate ‘thinks about a’ and ‘is one meter apart from a’ contain the BIP-
predicate ‘is identical to a’. But these predicates do not express trivialising properties, since
properties like thinking about a and being one meter apart from a can be shared and they do
not make PII true unless conjoined with properties like  being identical to a or not thinking
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about a or  being identical to a or not being one meter apart from a. But it is these latter
properties that trivialise PII.    
Third, it is possible to define trivialising properties, rather than predicates, since all
we need is a precise notion of property containment. For instance one may introduce a notion
of property containment via some stipulations like the following:
Every property contains itself.
Every  property  that  is  a  function  of  other  properties  contains  those  properties  (i.e.  a
conjunctive property contains its conjuncts;  a disjunctive property contains its disjuncts; a
negative property contains its negated property).
The relation of property containment is transitive.
Then, following Katz,  we say that a property  F contains a property of identity essentially
provided  F contains a property of identity but is not logically equivalent to a property that
does  not.  Then,  to  avoid  the  problem  of  superlative  properties,  we  define  trivialising
properties in terms of their containment of properties of identity, rather than BIPs:
D4 F is a trivialising property =def. F contains a property of identity essentially. 
D4 rightly counts properties (1)-(8) and (10) as trivialising properties. Furthermore, thanks to
the  precise  specification  of  the  containment  relation,  it  rightly  excludes  properties  like
thinking about a and being one meter apart from a from the class of trivialising properties. 
But  D4 has  several  problems.  First,  it  does  not  seem to count  as  trivialising the
property of being a member of {a}. For being a member of {a} does not seem to be a property
of identity, nor the complement of a property of identity,  nor a conjunctive or disjunctive
property  having  a  property  of  identity  as  one  of  its  conjuncts  or  disjuncts.  But  being  a
member of {a} is a trivialising property. For one could argue for PII thus: If a and b have all
their properties in common, then since a has the property of being a member of {a}, b has this
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property as well; but since whatever is a member of {a} is identical to a, a = b. But clearly
what is doing the work here is the property of  being identical to a, which must be had by
whatever is a member of {a}. 
Being a member of {a}  seems to contain the property of  being identical to a in the
sense that it is a relational property whose relatum ({a}) is specified in terms that depend on
the identity of  a and so, in that  sense,  on the property of  being identical  to a.  But if  we
redefine  containment  so  as  to  make  the  property  of  being  a  member  of  {a} contain  the
property of being identical to a, then we should make sure we avoid making thinking about a
or, even more to the point, being the only lover of a, contain a property of identity. 
But even if this can be done, a definition of trivialising properties in terms of a notion
of property containment will still be lacking, even if extensionally correct. The problem with
such  a  definition  is  that  it  does  not  explain  why  trivialising  properties  are  trivialising
properties. 
Why  should  properties  containing  properties  of  identity  trivialise  PII?  It  is  not
evident why this should be the case. Furthermore it is clear that merely containing a property
of identity is not what makes a property trivialising, since there are properties, like  being
green  and  (being  identical  to  a  or  being  numerically  distinct  from  a),  which  contain
properties  of identity but do not trivialise PII. This is why D4 does not define trivialising
properties purely in terms of containment, since the explanation of what it is for a property to
contain  a  property  of  identity  essentially  makes  reference  not  only  to  the  properties  it
contains but also to the properties it is logically equivalent to. But the relation of equivalence
is not a containment relation.15 
It may be claimed that this lack of purity is not a symptom of explanatory deficiency.
Why should  it  matter  that  the definition defines  trivialising properties  purely in terms of
property  containment?  Even  if  it  does  not  define  them  purely  in  terms  of  property
containment, that does not show that D4 fails to provide an explanation of why trivialising
15 Katz’s definition of  trivialising predicates  has the  same feature of  not  being purely in terms of
containment. 
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properties are trivialising. Perhaps what explains why they are trivialising properties is that
they contain a property of identity and are equivalent only to properties that do?
But why should such properties  be trivialising properties? It is not clear  why this
should be the case. Furthermore, there are reasons to doubt that this is what explains why
trivialising properties are trivialising. Consider property (5). It contains a property of identity
and is not logically equivalent  to a property that  does not. But this does not show it is  a
trivialising property  –  after  all,  property  (5)  can be  shared  and so  it  does  not  suffice  to
establish PII. The same applies to (6). 
Someone may say that even if (5) and (6) can be individually shared, they are such
that in virtue of what they contain the pair of them cannot be shared (i.e. no two things can
have both of them). But this does not explain why they are trivialising properties, since (6)
and (9) are also such that in virtue of what they contain the pair of them cannot be shared.
But (9) is not a trivialising property. 
It may be claimed that the relevant difference between (5) and (9) is that (5) contains
a property of identity while (9) does not. But we saw four paragraphs back that there are
properties that contain properties of identity but do not trivialise PII. Furthermore, saying that
it is in virtue of containing a property of identity that (5) is prevented from being shared with
(6) does not work. For it is no less by virtue of containing the property of being green than
containing a property of identity that (5) is prevented from being shared with (6). But it is by
virtue  of  containing the  property of  being green  that  (9)  is  prevented  from being shared
together with (6). 
5.  This  second  objection  to  D4  applies  only  if  we  are  interested  in  more  than  mere
extensional correctness. But extensional correctness cannot be the goal of our inquiry. For
extensional correctness per se does not provide an explanation of why trivialising properties
trivialise PII. So even if we hit an extensionally correct definition of trivialising properties,
we may still have serious difficulties in recognizing it as a correct definition, for there may be
properties such that it is not intuitively clear whether they trivialise PII. Furthermore, even if
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we knew that  a  certain  definition  is  extensionally  correct,  it  may not  be  philosophically
illuminating.  For  we  might  know  that  without  having  answered  the  question  of  why
trivialising properties trivialise PII.
But  knowing what  features  make trivialising properties  trivialise  PII puts  us in  a
position  to  define  trivialising  properties:  trivialising  properties  are  those  that  have  the
features in question. So the question I shall answer in this section is What makes trivialising
properties trivialise PII?
Trivialising properties are those that can be used to establish a trivial version of PII.
So  in  order  to  find  out  what  makes trivialising  properties  trivialise  PII,  we first  need  to
understand why the trivial version of PII is trivial. Once we know this it should be easy to see
what  makes trivialising properties trivialise PII, namely that  they have those features that
enable them to be used to establish a trivial version of PII. 
The  trivial  version  of  PII  is  the  version  established  by  arguments  like  the  ones
considered in §§2-3. I shall focus on argument (i)-(iv), which by using properties of identity
is a paradigmatic trivialising argument. So why do arguments like (i)-(iv) establish a trivial
thesis? 
PII is  meant  to  be a thesis  about  the connection  between qualitative  identity  and
numerical identity, namely that qualitative identity entails numerical identity: there cannot be
qualitative identity without  numerical  identity.  Equivalently, there cannot  be  solo numero
difference:  things  that  differ  numerically  must  also  differ  qualitatively.  But  (i)-(iv)
establishes that if a and b share all their properties, and therefore are qualitatively identical,
they  are  numerically  identical  because  they  share  a  property  of  identity.  But  sharing  a
property  of  identity  is  being  numerically  identical.  So  what  the  argument  shows  is  that
qualitatively identical things that are numerically identical are numerically identical. This is
trivial.
In other words, the argument establishes only that any numerically different things
differ in their properties of identity, without requiring that they differ in any other property.
But difference with respect to a property of identity is numerical difference, not qualitative
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difference. So all the argument establishes is that numerically distinct things are numerically
distinct. This is trivial.
So (i)-(iv) establishes a trivial version of PII because it only establishes the numerical
difference of numerically distinct things. What the argument establishes is only the letter of
the principle when formulated using unrestricted property quantifiers –  that no two things
can share all their properties – but it does not establish the spirit of the principle – that there
cannot be qualitative identity without numerical identity. 
What features of properties of identity account for this? That differing with respect to
them  is  differing  numerically.  For  since  differing  qualitatively  is  more  than  differing
numerically, simply establishing a difference with respect to properties of identity establishes
only a numerical difference, not a qualitative difference.
I  am not  saying that  properties  of  identity  are  trivialising because  differing  with
respect  to  them entails  no  more  than  a  numerical  difference.  I  am saying  that  they  are
trivialising because differing with respect to them is differing numerically. This is so even if
differing with respect to properties of identity entails a qualitative difference. In that case one
still cannot establish a qualitative difference by simply establishing a difference with respect
to  properties  of  identity:  one  needs  to  invoke  the  fact  that  a  difference  with  respect  to
properties of identity entails a qualitative difference. 
This also applies to properties of difference. They are the complements of properties
of identity. So having a property of difference is lacking a property of identity and lacking a
property of difference is having a property of identity. So differing with respect to properties
of difference is differing with respect to a property of identity and so differing with respect to
them is differing numerically. 
Thus  establishing  a  difference  with  respect  to  a  property  of  difference  only
establishes a numerical difference, not a qualitative difference. So properties of difference
are trivialising properties. 
There  are  two  things  to  distinguish.  One  is  what  the  trivialising  character  of
properties  of  identity and difference consists  in;  the other  is  what  makes them have that
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character. The trivialising character of properties of identity and difference consists in that
merely establishing a difference with respect to them only establishes a numerical difference
between the things in question. What makes properties of identity and difference have that
character is that being numerically different is differing with respect to those properties. 
The trivialising character  is common to all  and only trivialising properties.  Every
property such that merely establishing a difference with respect to it only establishes that the
things in question are numerically different is a trivialising property. Such a property can be
used to establish a trivial version of PII and so it is a trivialising property. And every property
such that merely establishing a difference with respect to it establishes more than a numerical
difference is such that  establishing a difference with respect to it  establishes a qualitative
difference. So, since establishing a difference with respect to it cannot be used to establish a
trivial version of PII, such a property is not trivialising.
But  although  the  trivialising  character  is  common  to  all  and  only  trivialising
properties, only in the case of properties of identity and difference what accounts for their
trivialising character is that differing with respect to them is differing numerically.16 
So  how can  a  property  F be  trivialising  without  being  a  property  of  identity  or
difference? Even if differing with respect to  F is not differing numerically, differing with
respect to F may consist in differing numerically. If differing with respect to F may consist in
differing numerically, merely establishing a difference with respect to  F only establishes a
numerical difference. So if differing with respect to F may consist in differing numerically, F
is a trivialising property.
Differing  with  respect  to  F may  consist  in  differing  numerically  if  and  only  if
differing with respect to F may consist in differing with respect to a property of identity or
property of difference. So properties such that differing with respect to them may consist in
differing with respect to a property of identity or difference are trivialising properties. 
16 Note that the trivialising character  of properties of identity and difference consists in that merely
establishing  a  difference  with  respect  to  them  only  establishes  that  the  things  in  question  are
numerically different – not that the things in question differ only with respect to properties of identity
and difference. The latter is not true. For instance, if and b differ with respect to properties of identity
and difference then they differ with respect to conjunctive properties having their properties of identity
and difference as conjuncts. 
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How can a property be such that differing with respect to it may consist in differing
with  respect  to  a  property  of  identity  or  difference?  Consider  conjunctive  properties.  A
conjunctive property is such that having or lacking it is having or lacking other properties. So
differing with respect to F&G is simply differing with respect to F or G or both. So differing
with respect to F&G may consist in differing with respect to F.
So  some conjunctive  properties  containing  properties  of  identity  are  such  that  a
difference with respect to them may simply consist in a difference with respect to a property
of identity. Consider the property of  being identical to a and being green.  Differing with
respect  to it  consists in differing with respect to either of its conjuncts.  So differing with
respect to it may consist in differing with respect to the property of being identical to a. And
so differing with respect to the property of being identical to a and being green may simply
be differing numerically. The same applies to conjunctive properties containing properties of
difference, like the property of being numerically distinct from a and being green. The same
is true of disjunctive properties like being numerically distinct from a or not being green and
being identical to a or being green. This is why such conjunctive and disjunctive properties
are trivialising properties.
It should be clear now why properties like being green,  being square  and being hot
are  not  trivialising  properties.  Differing  with  respect  to  them must  consist  in  more  than
simply differing numerically: it must consist in differing with respect to colour, shape and
temperature.
For similar reasons impure properties like being father of a, loving b, being close to
c, and being in the same place as d, are not trivialising properties. Differing with respect to
these  properties  must  be  more  than  differing  with  respect  to  a  property  of  identity  or
difference: it must be differing with respect to fathering  a, loving  b, being close to  c, and
being in the same place as  d. Let  e be the father of  a. Even if origin is essential, and so  e
cannot fail to be the father of a provided a exists, there is more to being the father of a than
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being such that a exists and being identical to e. The extra is all that is involved in fathering
a. Similarly in the other cases.17 
This also explains why superlative properties are not trivialising properties. Differing
with respect to  being the tallest  man is more than differing with respect  to a property of
identity or difference: it is also differing with respect to height from other men. It also makes
clear why there are some complex properties containing properties of identity that are  not
trivialising properties,  namely those  properties  that  contain  properties  of  identity  but  are
logically equivalent to properties  that are not trivialising, like the conjunctive property of
being green and (being identical to a or being numerically distinct from a). Properties like
these are such that differing with respect to them must consist in differing with respect to a
non-trivialising  property,  in  this  case  the  property  of  being  green.  Thus  establishing  a
difference  with  respect  to  those  complex  properties  will  be  establishing  more  than  a
numerical  difference. Therefore such complex properties are not trivialising properties,  in
spite of containing properties of identity.18 
6.  So  far,  so  good.  But  how  about  the  property  of  being  a  member  of  {a}?  This  is  a
trivialising  property  but  it  does  not  appear  to  satisfy  our  characterisation  of  trivialising
properties. For even if differing with respect to it will require differing with respect to being
identical to a, it seems to require differing with respect to being a member of {a}, and so it
seems that a difference with respect to it cannot simply consist in a difference with respect to
the property of being identical to a. 
17 An interesting case is the property of having all parts in common with a. This is trivialising because
among the parts of a is its improper part, namely a itself. So this property leaves open the possibility
that a and b differ only with respect to their improper parts, in which case they differ only numerically.
Some people think that no two things can share all their proper parts. If it is true that no two things can
share all their parts then there is a non-trivial version of PII that is true. But this does not make the
property of  having all proper parts in common with a trivialising. Differing with respect to such a
property is differing more than merely numerically. Furthermore, the insight that no two things can
share all their parts, if indeed it is true, is not a trivial but a substantive metaphysical insight. 
18 There are other properties containing properties of identity that are not trivialising, and in this case
the explanation of  why they are  not  trivialising must be  different.  Consider  the property of  being
identical to a or being numerically distinct from a. This property is not trivialising because it must be
shared by everything and so, since no two things can differ with respect to it, not even a trivial version
of PII can be proved by its means. The property of being identical to a and being numerically distinct
from a is also such that it cannot be shared, though this time because nothing can have it. 
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Of course a is a member of {a} in virtue of being identical to a – that is, it has the
property of being a member of {a} in virtue of having the property of being identical to a. But
this cannot be what makes the property of  being a member of {a} trivialising. For that one
property is had in virtue of another only means that there is a particular relation between the
two – the in virtue of relation.19 It does not mean that differing with respect to one of those
properties consists in differing with respect to the other. 
But what if it was the case that all of the properties of a thing are had in virtue of
being that thing? In that case a would have all of its properties simply in virtue of being a.
Perhaps the world is like that. Perhaps things cannot share all their properties because they
have their properties in virtue of being the things they are. Or perhaps things cannot share all
their properties because every thing has a qualitative property that is necessarily peculiar to it
in virtue of being the thing it is. In either case PII would be true but it would be non-trivially
true. For even if things would be qualitative different in virtue of being numerically different,
differing qualitatively would still be more than differing numerically.20 
But that any thing numerically different from a must also differ from a with respect
to being a member of {a} is a trivial fact.  However mysterious the singleton membership
relation is, it appears that differing with respect to being a member of a singleton is no more
than differing numerically. How can this be? 
This is because, if sets exist, the identity of the members fixes what sets they belong
to. And this is, in turn, because given a set S with certain things as members, there is no more
to being a member of S than being one of those things. So, given {a}, there is no more to
being a member of {a} than being a, i.e. being identical to a. Thus the property of being a
member of {a} is the property of being such that {a} exists and being identical to a. 
19 This relation between the properties in question is different from their being necessarily coextensive.
For, assuming that necessarily  a exists if and only if so does {a}, the necessary coextension of the
properties is symmetrical: nothing can have one of the properties of being identical to a and being a
member of {a} without having the other – but although a has the property of being a member of {a} in
virtue of having the property of being identical to a, it does not have the latter in virtue of having the
former. 
20 It is important to emphasise that the non-triviality of PII in these situations would not be due to our
ignorance that things have all their properties, or some properties necessarily peculiar to them, in virtue
of their identity. Even if we discovered this, through metaphysical argument or any other means, this
would be a discovery of a non-trivial fact.
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It is frequently asserted that a belongs to {a} in virtue of being a rather than being a
in virtue of belonging to {a}. My proposed account of the property of being a member of {a}
nicely explains why this is so: being a member of {a} consists in satisfying two conditions,
one of which is being identical  to  a,  but being identical  to  a does not consist  in being a
member of {a}. 
This  also  goes  some  way  to  dispel  the  mystery  associated  with  the  singleton
membership relation. According to David Lewis the relation of singleton to member holds in
virtue of qualities or external relations of which we have no conception whatsoever. That is,
we do not clearly understand what it is for a singleton to have a member (Lewis 1991: 35). If
my account of the property of being a member of {a} is right then we have a conception of
the relations in virtue of which a thing is a member of a singleton: these are existence and
identity. 
But there is a sense in which Lewis is right that the singleton membership relation is
mysterious.  Singletons are atoms and the connection with their  members is primitive  and
thereby in some sense mysterious and opaque. So we do not know in virtue of what a certain
singleton has a certain thing as its member. That is, we do not know in virtue of what the
property of  being a member of {a} is the property of  being such that {a} exists and being
identical to a rather than the property of being such that {a} exists and being identical to b.
After all, if {a} exists, b has the property of being such that {a} exists and being identical to
b, but this does not make it a member of {a}. But this is a mystery that we should expect. For
there is nothing in virtue of what {a} is the singleton of a as opposed to the singleton of b: it
just is. So there is nothing in virtue of what the property of  being a member of {a} is the
property of  being such that {a} exists and identical to a rather than the property of  being
such that {a} exists and identical to b: it just is one rather than the other.
Nothing in my account of the property of being a member of {a} helps with this. All
my account says is what the property of  being a member of {a} consists in, and makes the
property of  being identical to a part of that property. So, given that being a member of {a}
consists partly in being identical to a, my account makes clear why a is a member of {a} in
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virtue of being a rather than being a in virtue of being a member of {a}. But nothing in my
account explains why being a member of {a} consists partly in being identical to  a rather
than being identical to  b. To understand this we should, I think, know in virtue of what a
singleton  has  its  members.  But  there  is  nothing  in  virtue  of  which  a  singleton  has  its
members, so that my account does not explain this should not be seen as a problem for it.21
It may be thought that a problem for my account is that it does not make clear why
the singleton membership relation has the formal features it has, e.g. irreflexivity, asymmetry,
intransitivity. But there is no reason why an account of what the property of being a member
of {a} consists in should make clear why singleton membership has those formal features.
This is not an account of singleton membership in general: it is an account of what it is for a
thing to be a member of its singleton. What matters is simply that my account be compatible
with those formal features of the singleton membership relation, and it is. 
The property of  being such that {a} exists and being identical to a is a conjunctive
property one of whose conjuncts is the property of being identical to a, and so differing with
respect to  being a member of {a} may consist in differing with respect to the property of
being identical to a. Thus differing with respect to being a member of {a} may be differing
numerically. Even more, since whenever two things differ with respect to being a member of
{a} both of them are such that {a} exists, differing with respect to  being a member of {a}
must, and therefore does, consist in differing numerically.
So there are properties such that differing with respect to them consists in differing
numerically and there are properties such that differing with respect to them may consist in
differing numerically. In both cases such properties can be used to establish a trivial version
of  PII,  since  establishing  a  difference  with  respect  to  them  establishes  no  more  than
numerical difference. These are the trivialising properties. 
But  it  will  be  impossible  to  establish  a  trivial  version  of  PII  by  establishing  a
difference with respect to a property such that differing with respect to it  must consist  in
21 Here I go beyond Lewis, who seems to think that there may be something in virtue of why singletons
have their members. 
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more than differing with respect to a property of identity, and so it must consist in more than
differing numerically. These are the non-trivialising properties. 
7. We can now define trivialising properties as follows: 
D5.  F is  a  trivialising  property  =def. Differing  with  respect  to  F is  or  may  be  differing
numerically.
D5 is an intensional definition of trivialising properties: it purports to tell us what to be a
trivialising  property  consists  in  rather  than  merely  specifying  the  class  of  trivialising
properties.  Since  it  tells  us  what  is  to  be a  trivialising  property,  D5  is  philosophically
illuminating in a way in which a mere specification of the class of trivialising properties is
not.
By saying what trivialising properties are, D5 specifies a certain class of properties
as the class of trivialising properties. D5 is right in this respect to the extent that the class it
specifies includes the properties of identity and all the other trivialising properties we have
considered. But is D5 extensionally correct? Do all and only trivialising properties satisfy
D5? Yes. For, as I have argued, D5 is intensionally correct. So it is extensionally correct. 
We now know what trivialising properties are. So we know what properties should be not be
quantified over in order not to trivialise PII. Since not all impure properties are trivialising
properties, it should now be clear that one can quantify over some impure properties without
trivialising it and so that there are at least three non-trivial versions of PII: PII1, PII2 and
PII2.5.22
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